The article follows the reception of the philosophy of Yehudah Halevi (1075--1141) within the Breslau school of Jewish thought during the second half of the nineteenth century. Special focus is given to the discussion of Halevi in the writings of David Kaufmann and Julius Guttmann. Both scholars admire Halevi's Sefer haKuzari because they discovered a certain analogy between his medieval project of an intellectual apology of Judaism and their own endeavors in Breslau to philosophically justify the existence of Judaism in modernity. In their point of view, Halevi has achieved his results, however, without forcing the wealth of traditional Jewish teachings into an artifi cial system of thought, as did Maimonides after him. Thus, Halevi became for the Breslau scholars a personal example of Jewish integrity, combining faithful adherence to Judaism with intellectual penetration of its doctrines. The founding director of the Breslau seminary, the conservative Rabbi Zacharias Frankel (1801-1875), was rather skeptical as to the contribution of the newly invented discipline of historiography and the much older, but always somewhat antinomian fi eld of religious philosophy, to the daily practice of the rabbi.
of Gersonides (1288-1344), a thinker he virtually rediscovered for the academic world.
3 Also Heinrich Graetz was eventually teaching history in Breslau. But, nevertheless, Graetz frequently included longer philosophical discussions in his landmark Geschichte der Juden (History of the Jews), published in 11 volumes between 1853 and 1870. It was Graetz, and not Joel, who in 1861 first devoted a comprehensive and rather euphoric passage to the major philosophical work of Yehudah Halevi (1075-1141), the Sefer ha Kuzari. 4 This treatise had formed like no other the intellectual reflection of Judaism on its own religious theories-because it was not only less radical than Maimonides' Guide but also much easier readable. The book essentially contains an elaborate fictive dialog between the King of the Kusars and a Jewish theologian about Judaism and its doctrines. The King's wish to convert to the Jewish religion provides Halevi with a perfect literary frame for his actual intention: the philosophical justification of the truth of Judaism, as he conceives it. Now, interestingly, the theological differences between the Guide and the Kuzari gave rise to two rivalling camps within Jewish intellectual history, and the antagonism expressed through those two works continued in a certain sense far into modernity. The division is usually described as the difference between particularism and universalism in approaching the basic tenets of Judaism, but in fact it goes far beyond that paradigm. While, for the followers of Halevi, the revelation of the Torah at Mount Sinai was a historical fact, a singular supernatural event that not only secured the authority of Jewish law but in fact first established the Jewish people as an almost impenetrable national unit, for the Maimonidean school, revelation seems to be rather an ongoing process: every new generation has to discover the essence of knowledge, the unchangeable "divine truth," for itself. For Halevi, the factual bearing witness by hundreds of thousands of Israelites at Mount Sinai grounded the truth of Judaism, which from that time on existed outside and above history, both as a nation and as a religion. For Maimonides and his modern disciples, the validity of Judaism's legal regulations is disconnected from the assumption of a historically experienced "divine source" of this law. Validity must exclusively be measured against the law's content and its effectiveness to facilitate the constant and infinite approaching of divine holiness that Maimonides viewed as man's task in history.
In light of this context, it seems to be interesting, which of the above-mentioned medieval philosophical schools, that of Halevi or that of Maimonides, would prevail in the modernizing enterprise of the Wissenschaft scholars, working at the Breslau Rabbinical Seminary of the nineteenth century. Much points to a preference of the rationalist Guide over the revelationist Kuzari, given the overall tendency of these scholars to approach Jewish literature for the first time with academic and thus unbiased criteria. It seems that Maimonides' religious universalism and his uncompromising quest for philosophical truth was more to the taste of the Breslau theologians than Halevi's purpose-driven and particularistic romanticism. But as the present study will show, for the second half of the nineteenth century, almost the opposite of this assumption is the case: Many of the Breslau pioneers of the Wissenschaft movement prefer, at least in their personal assessment, the thought of Yehuda Halevi over what they see as "soulless" Maimonidean rationalism. Still under the influence of a philosophically Hegelian and an aesthetically romantic worldview, they see nothing in the Guide but cold intellectualism applied to their beloved "spiritual" Judaism. Halevi's Kuzari, however, was completely different-in the eyes of both the Breslau chief rabbi Abraham Geiger (unaffiliated with the seminary) and Heinrich Graetz.
6 "Never before has the great significance of Judaism and the Jewish people been expressed more eloquently," Graetz summarized the Kuzari emphatically, "thoughts and feelings, philosophy and poetry are melded in this original system of Yehuda Halevi, the Castilian, in order to establish a high ideal, representing the point of unifi cation of heaven and earth."
7 Graetz account of the Kuzari's theology, in the sixth volume of his Geschichte der Juden from 1861, was consciously biased towards Halevi. What is more, Graetz claims that Halevi, with his "true opinion about the worth of the speculative knowledge of dogmatic metaphysics," not only stood alone in his own time but was even ahead of his time by several centuries. 8 This early, enthusiastic assessments of the medieval treatise by a Breslau scholar set the tone for many years to come.
In 1853, David Cassel had published in Berlin his long-announced fi rst ever academic edition of the entire Kuzari, including a German translation and commentary, 9 and already in 1859 and 1860 Jacob Bernays read philosophical lectures about the Kuzari "for the advanced student" of the Breslau seminary. During the 1870s and the 1880s, lectures and reading courses on the Kuzari became an integral part of the seminary's curriculum and thus standard knowledge of a whole generation of Breslau-trained rabbis. 10 Halevi's thought had a lasting infl uence on some of the most infl uential Breslau graduates, as two major examples shall show in what follows: that of David Kaufmann, and 30 years later, the example of Julius Guttmann.
On January 28, 1877, the young scholar David Kaufmann (1852-1899) gave his offi cial farewell address to the Breslau Rabbinical Seminary where, for the previous 10 years of his life, he had fi rst studied and later became a teacher himself. The subject that Kaufmann chose for this speech was indicative both for the seminar's increasing orientation towards research into medieval Jewish philosophy and for Kaufmann's own theological preferences: he spoke about the Characterization of Yehuda Halevi, as the title of the lecture has it. Kaufmann was a lifelong and ardent follower of Halevi, as a poet certainly, but to a large extent also as a religious philosopher. Indeed, Kaufmann was quite arguably the most passionate admirer of the Kuzari within the whole of the Wissenschaft des Judentums. At the time of Kaufmann's farewell address to Breslau, his fi rst and most important scholarly work was already in press: a detailed study of the teachings regarding the divine attributes in several medieval Jewish philosophers, among them, Yehuda Halevi. 11 In the printed version of the lecture that appeared still the same year, Kaufmann already referred to the discussion of Halevi in this book, which was to be published yet later on in 1877.
Explaining the choice of his subject, Kaufmann exclaims that Halevi was for him nothing less than "a revelation of religious genius and the supreme bloom of Jewish thought" [die herrlichste Blüte des jüdischen Geistes]. Kaufmann would not hesitate to call Halevi the "richest and deepest thinker of the Jewish Middle Ages," and though conceding that probably Ibn Gabirol was the better philosopher and that Maimonides was more knowledgeable and possessed a sharper intellect, yet only Halevi is a cohesive personality, because he "thinks what he feels and lives what he thinks." Halevi, as described in Kaufmann's striking superlativism, is "unmatched in the wealth of new perspectives and unrivaled in the loftiness of his ideas." And even if we were "in need of shadows in order to demarcate his luminous fi gure," the shady sides in Halevi could only be blamed on the conditions of his time, and not at all on the thinker himself, as Kaufmann is convinced. 12 The secret of Halevi's character, Kaufmann noted, is the same as the basic characteristic of Judaism itself: a miraculous mixture of religion and nationality. Halevi's love for Palestine (the "lost but unalienable fatherland") would give his religious faith a realistic aspect, avoiding the otherwise almost unavoidable impression of "empty enthusiasm and mawkish adoration." Conversely, it is his religiosity that softened and idealized Halevi's otherwise exaggerated patriotism, "preserving his national fervor from wild outbursts of thirst for vengeance."
13
After Kaufmann had summarized the basic religious and philosophical doctrines of the Kuzari over five pages in the printed lecture, he himself raised the obvious objection against Halevi's denial of reason as the only source of knowledge-and subsequently Kaufmann rejected this "Socratic appeal" against the overall epistemology of his hero in the name of Halevi himself: Socrates would have objected that even though he could not deny the existence of a "divine wisdom" beyond human reason, being human he was unable to fathom it, because he himself possessed only human wisdom. To this, Halevi would have replied, Kaufmann wrote, that he has never declared to be able to rationally prove his doctrine of the "divine spark" burning in the souls of special human beings who are empowered by God with this gift. 14 Therefore, Socrates has no right to demand such proof. "Those who despair of the arrogance of reason eschew creating logical enthusiasm," Kaufmann added poetically, obviously identifying here from the depth of his heart with Halevi's fictive defense. Facts cannot be denied by intellectual concepts, repeating Halevi's well-known argument, as logical conclusions cannot disprove sense perception. Even "if reason sneers at this, its own platitudes are established from the outset"-God must and can only be felt and experienced. Eisler's account of the Kuzari continues over more than 30 pages of this book and gives mainly an unbiased introduction to Halevi's metaphysical thought in the context of his medieval contemporaries, and much less a theological analysis. At one point, however, Eisler wrote that as much as Ibn Gabirol and his theory of nature and Weltseele might be reminiscent of the natural philosophy of Friedrich Wilhelm Schelling (1775-1854), Yehuda Halevi strongly reminded him of another widely known German philosopher of the eighteenth century-Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743-1819). 16 This comparison to Jacobi is interesting in several respects. In general, it certainly means that Eisler and Kaufmann viewed the Kuzari not only in its medieval philosophical context but also that they in fact considered its importance, at least subconsciously, in the light of modern thought, if not a priori in the context of timeless philosophical truths about religion. More specifically, in the 1780s, Jacobi was the great adversary of Moses Mendelssohn in what came to be known as the pantheism controversy. Jacobi took an anti-rational stance against Mendelssohn's attempt to reclaim Spinoza for natural religion, and thus to defend not only his friend Lessing but first and foremost their common enlightenment project. 17 When Jacobi is compared to Halevi, therefore, inevitably the notional controversy between Maimonides and Halevi comes to mind, with Mendelssohn now consequently (and surprisingly, although not entirely justifiably) representing the author of the Guide.
One can only speculate about David Kaufmann's position on the controversy between Mendelssohn and Jacobi, given his obvious identification with the religious thought of Halevi, who supposedly was the theological predecessor of Jacobi.
18 Kaufmann, though, who knew Arabic and was an expert in Islamic medieval philosophy, Kaufmann saw this declaration of failure by Halevi as an estimable form of religious humility. The Kuzari is "one of the most remarkable works of medieval literature in general," Kaufmann concluded his address to the Breslau audience, and his extraordinary knowledge of this literature, far beyond the limits of Jewish philosophy, makes this statement signifi cant.
22
The same admiration for Halevi's religious philosophy is expressed in Kaufmann's seminal study on the divine attributes, also published in 1877. Halevi had redeemed religion from the paternalism of philosophy by deliberately denying the right to judge the truth of religious belief. As the fi rst medieval Jewish thinker, Halevi understood the concept of a self-suffi cient faith, confi dently despising the frail crutch of human speculation. For the same reason, Halevi refused to force the wealth of traditional Jewish teachings into an artifi cial system of thought. While others anxiously tried to prove the existence of God, Halevi believed that God was an indisputable precondition of all philosophy. For Halevi, the Divine was not the conclusion of a speculation but an absolute certainty of intuitive knowledge. In the Kuzari, religion would no longer "pleadingly look up at sublime philosophy but rather glance down at her with merciful sympathy" for not having found this certainty in all her exertion of thought, although it could have been gained much more easily.-To all those introductory remarks regarding his treatment of Halevi in the book, Kaufmann has nothing to add, thus apparently indicating his agreement to a substantial extent.
23
Kaufmann is the fi rst Halevi-scholar of the Wissenschaft movement who consistently worked with the Arabic original of the Kuzari, at several places correcting Cassel's German translation from 1853 according to the Arabic manuscript he used. 24 Kaufmann also contradicted Heinrich Graetz' theory of the originality of Halevi's epistemology: It was Halevi's philosophical innovation that he fi rst "had the courage to assign to human thought its natural limits," Graetz wrote in 1861. 25 The restriction of human reason to certain limits is already found in Al-Ghazali, Kaufmann repeats here. More interesting is Kaufmann's discovery that thus the infl uence of AlGhazali on Jewish medieval philosophy must be dated 300 years earlier than it had so far been assumed to have incepted, with histories of the development of Jewish philosophy usually referring to the impact that Al-Ghazali had on the thought of the Jewish philosopher Hasdai Crescas (1340-1410). Concerning Kaufmann's own project, to write the history of medieval thought on the divine attributes, he is forced to ask this crucial question: How can we expect Halevi, who tried to ban speculation completely from the realm of religion, to give a philosophical theory of God's attributes? But Halevi is far from being afraid of a contest between philosophy and religion, Kaufmann explains. To assume that Halevi claimed that precisely the absurdity of a religious doctrine would prove its religious validity was erroneous and would only confuse our understanding of Halevi's thought. 27 For the author of the Kuzari, pursuing religious philosophy was dispensable but not wrong, Kaufmann argued. Religion is not reliant on speculative justification, according to Halevi, but rational proofs are helpful for those weak and misled believers who exclusively trust in them.
28 For Kaufmann's modern adaption of the Kuzari, it is extremely important to emphasize that Halevi was not an outright proponent of irrationalism, holding religion to contain truths that reason must reject. Both Breslau scholars, Graetz and Kaufmann, insist that Halevi's re-establishing of the rights of religious faith, as opposed to speculative thought, is not necessarily dependent on a rejection of reason as such-a position that they obviously felt to be a precondition for their agenda of Halevi's integration into their own concept of a spiritually renewed Judaism in modernity.
In the years to follow, the study of medieval Jewish philosophy within the Wissenschaft movement further intensified not only in Breslau but also at the other three modern rabbinical seminaries that were founded in the 1870s. Between 1884 and 1909, about 15 doctoral dissertations were written by graduates from the four seminaries as surveys of the history of medieval Jewish philosophy of a specific field (theodicy, prophecy, freedom of will, etc.). This phenomenon was due to these rabbinic students being obligated by their institutions to earn a doctorate from a German university in order to qualify for a rabbinic career. Among those dissertations was the thesis of Ludwig Stein (1859-1930), the later famous sociologist and diplomat, written at the orthodox Hildesheimer Seminar in Berlin. 29 The study of the Kuzari increased outside of Breslau, very likely in the wake of the scholarly results achieved at the seminary. In 1885, the Arabist Hartwig Hirschfeld (1854-1934) published his new German translation of the Kuzari, this time relying on the Arabic original, which in the meantime had become available for the Wissenschaft scholars in four different manuscripts. In 1887, Hirschfeld also published an academic Arabic edition, and then in 1905, after he had become professor at the Jews' College in London, he published the first translation of the Kuzari into English.
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In Breslau itself, it was first and foremost the scholar and rabbi Jacob Guttmann (1845-1919) who worked extensively on medieval Jewish thought, publishing on Ibn Daud (1879), Saadia (1882), Ibn Gabirol (1889), and Isaac Israeli (1911) . 31 Concerning the Kuzari, however, it was ultimately only Jacob Guttmann's son, the philosopher Julius Guttmann (1880 Guttmann ( -1950 , whose discussion of the Kuzari gave the most comprehensive, the most analytic, and, at the same time, the most relevant account for contemporary questions of religious philosophy.
32 Writing in 1911, Guttmann succeeded in his great essay on The Relation between Religion and Philosophy in Yehuda Halevi to offer a sharp, prioritizing analysis of the structure, the originality, and also of the inconsistencies and the contradictions in Halevi's work. 33 But actually Guttmann's main interest lies elsewhere. The central objective of his text is to identify Halevi's contribution to the attempt of modern liberal theology in defining the place of religion 27 Kaufmann, Attributenlehre, 135. 28 Kaufmann, Attributenlehre, 137. The same argument was used by Nahmanides (1194 -1270) in his defense of Maimonides' rationalism. In a letter to the French rabbis who had banned the author of the Guide, Nahmanides wrote that Maimonides' treatise was not intended for those of unshaken belief, but for those who had been led astray by the works of Aristotle. A critical edition of Nahmanides as a specifi c and independent part of human thought and spirit; not identical with philosophical ethics, but also not irrational or mystical. For this defi nition, which seems to be Guttmann's most important project throughout his intellectual life, Halevi's thought is clearly of some support to him. 34 At the outset of his work, Guttmann, like Kaufmann und Eisler, compares Halevi to Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, whose famous statement that a demonstrated god is no longer God resembles the Kuzari's theory that it would be a defi ciency in God, should we be able to know Him. 35 Knowledge, according to Halevi, is limited to historical events. The self-suffi cient belief in the truth of Judaism and its teachings, advocated by Halevi, is merely built on and justifi ed in knowing history; it can neither be demonstrated by pure reason, nor is it rooted in what Guttmann calls "a function of our soul," the specifi c human behavior called religion. While the Kuzari is otherwise full of descriptions of the incomparability of the religious experience and the pleasures of religious feelings, Guttmann argued, religious belief for Halevi is a mere act of knowing. 36 Like most medieval thinkers, he is still unaware of the concept of religion as "an aspect of the spirit [Geist] , underlying diff erent religions in equal measure." Religion is thus not at all a capacity of human consciousness for Halevi, who is not yet interested, as Guttmann himself obviously is, in the relation between philosophy and religious consciousness, but only in the relation between knowledge and revelation. 37 In order to solve this contradiction between belief in history and religious experience, Guttmann refers to Halevi's theory of the reasons behind the commandments: Many of the Biblical precepts are essentially hidden to rational understanding according to the Kuzari, their sole purpose being to create an intimate connection between man and God. This life with God, being the eff ect of religious belief and observance, is Halevi's version of actual religious behavior. While Halevi's line of argument for the truth of Judaism "never overcame a superfi cial, reason-based supernaturalism," Guttmann explained, he penetrated "into real depths where he described the religious life unfolding within the believing Jewish community." This description was the real contribution of the Kuzari to an understanding of religion, surpassing mere historical reproduction. Here, Halevi drew on his own religious consciousness, according to Guttmann, and thus detected, at the same time, the essentials of religious behavior in general. 38 The modern and relevant aspect in the teachings of the Kuzari lies for Guttmann precisely in the sharp juxtaposition of the discursive thinking of the philosopher, for whom God will always remain a theoretical problem, and "the absolutely new psychological fact of a feeling for God." Nothing else is meant when modern thinkers contrast knowledge [Erkenntnis] with religion, seen "as a specifi c behavior of the soul," Guttmann claimed. The uniqueness of religious behavior consists for both Guttmann and Halevi in a life with God, not in possessing knowledge of God, because "the actuality of God is not a result of cognition, but the result of a personal connection with God." 39 Halevi's account of human consciousness of the divine moves him very near a modern concept of religion, Guttmann concluded-despite the many drawbacks of this still very vague and unspecifi c theory.
Giving examples, Guttmann argued that Halevi was not only unable to fi nd a clear expression for the certainty of God's reality, but he apparently contradicted the modernity of his thought on religion with his peculiar insistence that Israel alone was destined (by natural disposition) for a life with God. Guttmann goes to great eff ort to disprove this classical point of criticism of Halevi. Probably as the fi rst modern scholar discussing the Kuzari, he pointed out that the apparent assumption of a biological, qualitative diff erence between Jews and other peoples in their closeness to God would create a strange antagonism to the frame story of the book, that is, the attempted conversion of the king of the Khazars. According to Guttmann's reading of the Kuzari (especially of V, 2), the difference cannot be absolute, but at best gradual, for even the king, albeit as a convert to Judaism, is able to enter the intimate connection with God that is the specific feature of Israel's national disposition. If thus the absolute principle is broken, the way to God is paved for the other peoples too, even without officially joining Judaism, and the ability to associate with God becomes a part of human nature. This last step is realized for Guttmann in Halevi's concept of Messianism. The messianic idea of the Biblical prophets was from the 1840s a basic tenet of Jewish reform theology, understood now as a significant contribution of the Jewish religion to the ethical development of world civilization, and thus philosophically justifying the continued existence of Judaism in modernity. 40 When Halevi (in Kuzari IV, 23) wrote that Israel is the root from which the tree of a unified mankind grows, rejecting idolatry and accepting the one God, Guttmann argued accordingly that it then follows that the "precondition for this education of humanity for its messianic future must necessarily be seen, in that all men originally possess a religious disposition, which is only in need of a gradual increase in order to culminate in true community with God." 41 There are other weak points in Halevi's doctrine of religious consciousness that cannot be removed by the modern theologian. Halevi shared with his Aristotelian adversaries the religious ideal of individual contemplation of God, though not in the form of rational intuition, but as the awareness of the immediate presence of God. "From this state of pious bliss, no inner necessity leads to the moral deed," Guttmann complained in the wake of the neo-Kantian religious teachings of Hermann Cohen, for whom "holiness is a mode of action." 42 In the Kuzari, the link between "the love of God and ethical action remains entirely on the surface, because the ethical character of the certainty God is not sufficiently asserted." 43 Halevi's doctrine of the community with God and its spiritual repercussions is in the end not more than a description of religious behavior; it does not yet contain a philosophical justification for the reliance on the inner certainty of religious feelings. That must be achieved by the modern philosopher of religion, according to Guttmann, and the last pages of his essay on the Kuzari are devoted to an interesting outline of such a justification-especially in carving out the difficult relation of religion and moral reason. But the appreciation of Yehuda Halevi shall not be affected by the decision of this question, Guttmann wrote in summary, because "even if the right of religious belief is based on rational ethics-the immediacy of the feeling still represents the psychological form of religious life." It was the enduring merit of the Kuzari to have revealed this fundamental insight in the nature of religious behavior. 44 In summary of the two elaborate accounts of Yehuda Halevi's Kuzari, discussed here, it can be emphasized that both Breslau scholars, David Kaufmann and Julius Guttmann, agree as to the contemporary relevance of the medieval treatise for Jewish theology. In resistance to the long centuries of the iron rule of the Talmudic legalism over Jewish thought, the modernizing theologians of the nineteenth century attempted to replace legal fiction with true spirituality, formal or intuitive acceptance of religious law with an honest Jewish lifestyle, combining faithful adherence to Judaism with intellectual penetration of its doctrines. Here the thought of Yehuda Halevi proved to be highly advantageous, more than any other medieval philosophical system. Halevi was both a philosopher and a romantic, and, what was most important for the Breslau scholars, he was a personal example of Jewish integrity-he "thinks what he feels and lives what he thinks," as Kaufmann put it. Eventually, with the turn of the twentieth century, Halevi's philosophy was integrated by a new generation of neo-Kantian scholars of Judaism into their own reflections about the then most pressing question in front of them: the share religiosity had as a distinct function of the human consciousness in its relation to moral reason. 45 
